Perceiving as Predicting by Clark, Andrew
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceiving as Predicting
Citation for published version:
Clark, A 2014, Perceiving as Predicting. in D Stokes, M Matthen & S Biggs (eds), Perception and Its
Modalities. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 23-43.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Perception and Its Modalities
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
Perceiving as Predicting 
 
Andy Clark, 
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, 
University of Edinburgh, UK  
 
 
Abstract 
 
According to an emerging vision in computational cognitive neuroscience, 
perception (rich, full-blooded, world-presenting perception of the kind we 
humans enjoy) depends heavily on prediction. To visually perceive, if this 
schema is correct, is to meet incoming visual information with a set of 
matching top-down predictions that track the evolving visual signal across 
multiple spatial and temporal scales. In this chapter I first introduce this general 
explanatory schema. I then display some recent evidence for the schema, and 
discuss to what extent it marks a radical departure from previous (‘feature-
detection based’) models of perception. I end by exploring some implications 
of the schema for questions concerning multi-modal and cross-modal effects in 
sensory processing, and for our understanding of the deep and fundamental 
relations between perception, imagination, and understanding. 
 
 
1. Perceiving as Predicting 
 
1.1 Predictive Coding 
 
A familiar view depicts perception as essentially a process of  ‘bottom-up’ 
feature detection. Thus, in the case of vision, detected colors, edges, and shapes 
might act as the building blocks for detected objects (cats, dogs) and states of 
affairs (dogs chasing a cat, perhaps). Scientific versions of the paradigm depict 
early perception as building towards a complex world model by a feedforward 
process of evidence accumulation. Visual cortex, to take the most-studied 
example, is thus “traditionally viewed as a hierarchy of neural feature detectors, 
with neural population responses being driven by bottom-up stimulus features” 
(Egner et al 2010 p. 16601). This is a view of the perceiving brain as passive 
and stimulus-driven, taking energetic inputs from the senses and turning them 
into a coherent percept by a kind of step-wise build-up moving from the 
simplest features to the more complex. From pixel intensities up to lines and 
edges and on to complex meaningful shapes (like teacups), accumulating 
structure and complexity along the way in a kind of Lego-block fashion. In 
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these modelsi then “sensory processing was considered to consist mainly of the 
sequential extraction and recombination of features, leading to the veridical 
reconstruction of object properties” (Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001 p.704). 
 
“Predictive coding” – the main topic of the present treatment - works by a kind 
of reversal of such passive evidence accumulation schemes. In these models 
(see Rao and Ballard (1999), Lee and Mumford (2003), Friston (2005) (2010)) 
percepts emerge via a recurrent cascade of predictions that involve  (mostly 
sub-personal) expectations, spanning multiple spatial and temporal scales, 
about the present nature and state of the world as presented via the driving 
sensory signal. That driving sensory signal is compared to the predictions, and 
mismatches send forward error signals that nuance or alter the prediction until 
a match is found and the sensory data is ‘explained away’. This process runs 
concurrently and continuously (until it settles) across multiple levels of a 
processing hierarchy. 
 
At first sight, this seems extremely implausible. How can perception, a process 
that surely puts us in contact with the world, be a matter of prediction? Doesn’t 
this mistake perception for (something more like) imagination? And anyway, 
how can we issue a prediction unless we already know a good deal about what’s 
out there? 
 
To see how the predictive coding alternative works, it helps to start by noticing 
that the key predictions made by the brain concern not what is about to happen 
but what is already the case. Specifically, the predictions made by the brain 
concern the current states of some of its own neural populations. In 
perception, if these models are correct, each layer of neural processing is trying 
to predict the current input to the layer below (except for the bottom layer, 
such as the retina, which ‘simply’ transduces an energetic signalii). Each layer 
does this while simultaneously responding to predictions from the layer above. 
The key task of the brain (or at any rate, the cortex) is thus to learn a stack of 
models that capture regularities in how the sensory signal is most likely to vary 
in time and space. By deploying the right models at the right time, the brain can 
then issue correct predictions (so it is minimizing its own prediction errors). 
This (as Hohwy (2007) also notes) induces a striking reversal in which the 
driving sensory signal is really providing corrective feedback on the top-down 
predictions. Friston expresses the point well: 
 
“In this view, cortical hierarchies are trying to generate sensory data 
from high-level causes. This means the causal structure of the world is 
embodied in the backward connections. Forward connections simply 
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provide feedback by conveying prediction error to higher levels. In 
short, forward connections are the feedback connections. This is why we 
have been careful not to ascribe a functional label like feedback to 
backward connections.” Friston (2005) p.825 
 
 
It is the forward flow of error that must now carry any new information 
coming from the world, allowing new predictive models to be selected and 
deployed in the top-down cascade. The upshot is that: 
 
“In predictive coding schemes, sensory data are replaced by prediction 
error, because that is the only sensory information that has yet to be 
explained” Feldman and Friston (2010) p.2 
 
 
Each layer in these systems thus displays two functionally distinct properties. It 
encodes how it takes the world to be, and it registers mismatches between 
those ‘takings’ and predictions coming from the layer above. Mismatches flow 
forward as error signals to the level above, while its best guesses about the state 
of the world flow downwards as predictions to the layer below. Perception 
occurs when, across multiple layers of such processing that capture regularities 
at many spatial and temporal scales, the hugely interanimated set of predictions 
match the evolving sensory inputs, explaining them away so that the forward 
flow of error ceases or settles. 
 
Importantly, such models can be acquired by learning and that learning can itself 
be driven by the ongoing attempt to minimize errors in the multilayer 
prediction of inputs. This is because the brain’s predictions improve when it 
uses a good model of the structured signal source. Good predictions thus 
increase the posterior probability of the model. In this way the attempt to 
predict can be used to drive the learning itself, generating the very models that 
are then used to predict. In this pleasingly boot-strappy way (‘empirical Bayes’) 
a multi-layer system can acquire its own priors (the expectations used in 
prediction) from the data, as it goes along. 
 
Thus consider, as a simple early example, Rao and Ballard’s (1999) model of 
predictive coding in the visual cortex. Rao and Ballard implemented a 
multilayer neural network whose input was samples (image patches) from 
pictures of natural scenes. These visual signals were processed via a hierarchical 
system in which each level tried (in the way just sketched) to predict the activity 
at the level below it using recurrent (feedback) connections. If the feedback 
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successfully predicted the lower level activity, no further action needed to 
ensue. Failures to predict enabled tuning and revision of the generative model 
(initially, just a random set of connection weights) being used to make the 
predictions, thus slowly delivering knowledge of the regularities governing the 
data. The forward connections between levels carried only the ‘residual errors’ 
(Rao and Ballard (1999) p.79) between top-down predictions and actual lower 
level activity, while the backward or recurrent connections carried the 
predictions themselves. Changing prediction thus corresponds to changing or 
tuning a hypothesis about the nature and temporal evolution of the lower level 
activity. This kind of prediction error calculation, operating within a 
hierarchical organization, allowed information pertaining to different spatial 
and temporal scales within the image to be played off one against the other 
such that:  
 
“prediction and error-correction cycles occur concurrently throughout 
the hierarchy, so top-down information influences lower-level estimates, 
and bottom-up information influences higher-level estimates of the 
input signal” Rao and Ballard (1999) p.80 
 
After exposure to thousands of image patches, the system had learnt to use 
responses in the first level network to extract features such as oriented edges 
and bars, while the second level network captured combinations of such 
features corresponding to patterns involving larger spatial configurations. Using 
the predictive coding strategy, and given only the statistical properties of the 
signals derived from the natural images, the network was thus able to induce a 
simple multi-layered model of the structure of the data source (images of 
natural scenes). 
 
Notice that as processing in this network unfolds, all that is passed forward 
from level 1 to level 2 is error  (the deviations from the predictions being sent 
downwards from level 2), and all that is passed downward is prediction. When 
downward prediction fully accommodates (‘cancels out’) the incoming signal, 
no more error flows forward and we perceive the world. The simulation also 
neatly captured well-documented ‘non-classical receptive field’ effects such as 
‘end-stopping’ (see also Rao and Sejnowski (2002)) where a neuron responds 
strongly to a short line falling within its classical receptive field but that 
response tails off as the line gets longer. The predictive coding explanation is 
that the response tails off as the line gets longer because longer lines and edges 
are the statistical norm in these natural scenes! So, after learning, longer lines 
are what is first predicted (and fed back, as a hypothesis) by the level two 
network. The strong firing of those level 1 ‘edge cells’ when driven by shorter 
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lines thus reflects error or mismatch:  the unusually short segment was not 
initially predicted by the higher-level network. This means that end-stopped 
cells may be learnt, and reflect the way the world is – they reflect the typical 
length of the lines and edges in natural scenes. In a different world, such cells 
would learn different responses. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Generative Models 
 
An important feature of the internal models that power such ‘predictive coding’ 
approaches is that they are generative in nature. That is to say, the knowledge 
(model) encoded by the units and weights at an upper layer must be such that 
those units and weights are capable of predicting the response profile of the 
layer below. That means that the model at layer N+1 becomes capable of 
generating the sensory data (i.e. the input as it would there be represented) at 
layer N (the layer below) for itself. Since this story applies all the way down to 
layers that are attempting to predict the inputs at the lowest level (the level of 
sensory transduction) that means that such systems are fully capable of 
generating ‘virtual’ sensory data for themselves.  
 
This is, in one sense, unsurprising. As Hinton (and for similar comments see 
Mumford (1992)) notes: 
 
“Vivid visual imagery, dreaming, and the disambiguating effect of 
context on the interpretation of local image regions suggests that the 
visual system can perform top-down generation” Hinton (2007b) p. 428 
 
 
In another sense it is surprising. It means that perception (at least, as it occurs 
in creatures like usiii) is co-emergent with (something quite like) imagination. 
And it means too – or so I suggest – that no creature is truly able to perceive 
anything that, in principle, they cannot imagine. Otherwise put, any creature 
that can perceive some state of affairs X also has the resources endogenously to 
generate a kind of ‘virtual’ version of that percept via top-down means alone. 
Of course, this does not mean that they can, by some deliberate act of will, 
bring this about. Indeed, it seems very likely that for some creatures acts of 
deliberate imagining (which I suspect may require the use of self-cueing via 
language) are simply impossible. But if these models are correct, then any 
creature able to perceive some state of affairs X has the neural resources to 
 6 
generate the very same sensory states (where that means the ones that would 
occur were X to be veridically detected) in the absence of Xiv. Whether that 
generation induces a conscious experience of a quasi-sensory nature is a 
question I here leave open. But at the very least, there now emerges a deep 
duality between perception and the endogenous generation of ‘virtual’ sensory 
data. 
 
The use of such ‘generative models’ for perception and recognition is 
increasingly dominant in both theoretical and applied work on machine 
learning. It is no accident that early explorations of these themes involved items 
with names such as the ‘wake-sleep algorithm’ (Hinton et al (1995)) and talk of 
the network generating patterns for itself ‘in fantasy’. In all these models top-
down connections are generative ones, capable of causing (generating) the very 
same kinds of patterns of lower-level activity that would ensue given apt 
sensory (bottom-up) input. A more recent example can be found in Hinton’s 
2007a treatment, aptly titled “To Recognize Shapes, First Learn to Generate 
Images”. Here, instead of attempting to directly train a neural network to 
classify images, the network first learns to generate such images for itself. An 
important achievement of Hinton and colleagues (see Hinton et al (2006), and 
the review papers Hinton (2007b), (2010), Bengio (2009)) is to show how to 
learn, using unlabelled (i.e. not pre-classified) data a deep multi-layer version of 
such a generative modelv. This was an important advance over previous 
‘connectionist’ work (Rumelhart et al (1986)) that struggled to learn appropriate 
representations in a deep multi-layer context, and that required large bodies of 
pre-classified data to power learning using the back-propagation of error. 
 
There are, however, important differences separating the recent work by 
Hinton and colleagues (using so-called Restricted Boltzmann Machines – see 
Hinton (2007)) and the predictive coding story (see the review by Huang 
(2011)). The differences mostly concern the kinds of message passing scheme 
that are, and are not, allowed, and the precise ways that top-down and bottom-
up influences are used and combined during both learning and trained 
performancevi. What they share, though, is this emerging (indeed, state-of-the-
art) emphasis on the use of generative models in learning and in recognition.  
 
 
1.3 Analysis-by-Synthesis 
 
Work that uses generative models to predict inputs implements the much older 
idea of ‘analysis by synthesis’ (Neisser (1967), Yuille and Kersten (2006)) where 
this names a processing strategy in which: 
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“The mapping from low- to high-level representation (e.g. from acoustic 
to word-level) is computed using the reverse mapping, from high- to low-
level representation” Chater and Manning (2006, p.340). 
 
In this paradigm the brain does not build its current model of worldly causes by 
accumulating, bottom-up, a mass of low-level cues. Instead, the brain –in 
learning, in perceiving, and (see Friston, Mattout, and Kilner (2011)) in acting - 
tries to predict the current suite of low-level cues from its best high-level 
models of possible causes (see Bar (2007), Hohwy (2007), Friston (2010)). In 
this way: 
 
“Predictive, or more generally, generative models turn the inverse 
problem [here, the problem of converting sensory ‘measurements’ into 
information about external objects and sates of affairs] on its head. 
Instead of trying to find functions of the inputs that predict their causes, 
they find functions of estimated causes that predict the inputs” Friston 
(2002) p. 233 
 
 
1.4 Hierarchies of Hidden Causes 
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that the top-down generation of the sensory 
patterns that characterizes these models or approaches always proceeds (after 
learning) via multiple layers of processing that involve intermediate levels of 
representation. Thus (to offer an admittedly simplistic example) a program 
capable of dealing with written text might learn layers that deal (respectively) in 
words, in letters, and in the various kinds of stroke that make up the letters. 
Each of these levels of structure has its own characteristic regularities. Certain 
strokes tend to go together, as they form distinct letters; certain letters tend to 
go together as they form real words; certain words tend to go together as they 
make grammatical sentences, and so on. Each level of the processing hierarchy 
thus deploys a probabilistic generative model whose target is the layer of the 
hierarchy immediately belowvii. The internal processing hierarchy thus tracks 
nested causal structure in the source (sentences). In these models each layer 
embodies knowledge (taking the form of probability density distributions) 
about the hidden regularities (for example grammars, causes, or any so-called 
‘latent variables’) that are structuring the data as it is registered at the level 
below. An interesting implication is thus that the layered structure of the 
internal model will attempt to recapitulate actual (but hidden) structure in the 
world. In this way: 
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“The hierarchical structure of the real world literally comes to be 
‘reflected’ by the hierarchical architectures trying to minimize prediction 
error, not just at the level of sensory input but at all levels of the 
hierarchy” Friston (2002) p. 238 
 
To perceive the world, on these accounts, is to attempt to unearth layer upon 
layer of the actual causal structures that generated the sensory signals impinging 
on the organism.  
 
 
 
 
2. The Case for Predictive Coding 
 
2.1.Evidence 
 
The predictive coding approach, by using a hierarchical generative model to do 
top-down sensory prediction in learning and recognition, makes good sense of  
- and very efficient use of - a complex neuro-anatomy in which recurrent 
connectivity is massive and apparently functionally asymmetric (see e.g. Friston 
(2005), Bubic et al (2010)). It also explains several superficially distinct 
phenomena via a single fundamental mechanism. These include priming, end-
stopping (see section 1 above), repetition suppression, and confirmation bias. 
In the case of priming, recent results show that an expected percept becomes 
consciously available about 100 ms faster than an unexpected one (see Melloni 
et al (2011)). This, as the authors note, is easily explained if the process of 
stimulus recognition involves the activation of a top-down generative model 
that is attempting to match the incoming data stream with its own predictions. 
It is also well-known that stimulus-evoked neural activity is reduced by stimulus 
repetition. Summerfield et al (2008) manipulated the local likelihood of 
stimulus repetitions, showing that the repetition-suppression effect is itself 
reduced when the repetition is improbable/unexpected. This too is fluently 
explained by the predictive coding story: repetition normally reduces response 
because it reduces prediction error. Repetition-suppression may thus be a direct 
effect of predictive coding strategies at work in the brain, and would hence vary 
according to our local perceptual expectations. 
 
More generally, there is an emerging body of supportive fMRI and EEG work 
dating back to a pioneering fMRI study by Murray et al (2002) that reveals just 
the kinds of relationships posited by the predictive coding story. Here, as 
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higher level areas settled into an interpretation of visual shape, activity in V1 
was dampened, consistent with the successful higher level predictions being 
used to explain away (cancel out) the sensory data. Recent studies confirm this 
general profile (see eg Alink et al (2010)). 
 
2.2 Questioning Predictive Coding 
 
Early examples of the predictive coding approach (such as the seminal 1997 
work by Rao and Ballard described in section 1 above) were, however, met with 
some puzzlement, since they seemed radically different from the more standard 
picture of an (admittedly attention-modulated) feedforward cascade of simple-
to-complex feature detection. This puzzlement is well-captured by the 
comments from Koch and Poggio that accompanied the publication of this 
work. The passage is so perfectly expressive of some quite common worries 
that I hope the reader will forgive a long extract: 
 
“In predictive coding, the common-place view of sensory neurons as 
detecting certain ‘trigger’ or ‘preferred’ features is turned upside down in 
favor of a representation of objects by the absence of firing activity. This appears 
to be at odds with [data indicating that neurons] extending from V1 to 
inferior temporal cortex, respond with vigorous activity to ever more complex 
objects, including individual faces or paperclips twisted in just the right 
way and seen from a particular viewpoint” 
  
“In addition, what about all of the functional imaging data from humans 
revealing that particular cortical areas respond to specific image classes, 
such as faces or three-dimensional spatial layout? Is it possible that this 
activity is dominated by the firing of… cells actively expressing an error signal, a 
discrepancy between the input expected by this brain area and the actual 
image?” 
 
(Both quotes from Koch and Poggio (1999) p 10, my emphasis) 
 
There are two main worries being expressed here. First, a worry that the 
accounts are abandoning representation in favour of silence, since well-
predicted elements of the signal are ‘explained away’.  Second, a worry that the 
accounts thus seem in tension with strong evidence of increasingly complex 
representations tokened by activity in higher areas. Neither worry is justified 
however. To see why not, recall the architectural story outlined earlier.  Each 
layer, that story insists, must somehow support two functionally distinct kinds 
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of processing. For simplicity, let’s follow Friston (2005) and imagine this as 
each layer containing two functionally distinct kinds of cell or unitviii: 
 
 
- ‘representation units’, that encode that layer’s current best hypothesis 
(pitched at its preferred level of description) and that feed that 
hypothesis down as prediction to the layer below. 
 
- ‘error units’, that pass activation forward when local within-layer 
activity is not adequately accounted for  by  incoming top-down 
prediction from the layer above 
 
That means that more and more complex representations are indeed formed, 
and used in processing, as one moves up the hierarchy. It is just that the flow of 
representational information (the predictions), at least in the purest versions, is 
all downwards. It is in this sense that, as we saw earlier, the role of feedback is 
inverted in these models. Moreover, the upward flow of prediction error is 
itself a sensitive instrument, bearing fine-grained information about very 
specific failures of match. That’s why it is capable of inducing, in higher areas, 
complex hypotheses (consistent sets of representations) that can then be tested 
against the lower-level statesix. As a result, neither of the two worries raised by 
Koch and Poggio gets a grip. There are representational populations all the way 
up, and their activity is determined by the flow of error signals and the 
hypotheses that they select.  
 
 
2.3 An Example: The Fusiform Face Area 
 
Consider again the standard model of a stream of increasingly complex feature-
detection, such that responses (at the highest levels) reflect the presence of 
such items as faces, houses, etc. What the predictive coding story suggests is 
not that we abandon that model but that we enrich it, by adding within each 
layer cells specialized for the encoding and transmission of prediction error. 
Some cells at each level, if this is correct, are encoding features while others are 
registering errors relative to predictions about those features coming from the 
level above.  
 
The right evidence here is only just appearing, but it actually seems to fit best 
with this more complex ‘predictive coding’ profile. Thus consider the well-
established finding (Kanwisher et al (1997)) of increased activity in fusiform 
face area FFA when shown a face rather than (say) a house. Surely, a critic 
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might say, this is best explained by simply supposing that neurons in FFA have 
learnt to be active complex feature detectors for faces? It is immediately 
apparent that this is no longer straightforward, however, given that the 
predictive-coding story allows that FFA may indeed harbor units that specialize 
in the representation of faces, as well as ones that specialize in the detection of 
errors (mismatches between top-down predictions reaching FFA and the 
bottom-up signal). Thus, the difference is that if the predictive coding story is 
correct, FFA should also harbor error units that encode mismatches with 
predicted (face) activity. This provided a nice opportunity for some telling 
empirical tests. 
 
Egner et al (2010) compared simple feature detection (with and without 
attention) and predictive coding models of recorded responses in FFA.  The 
simple Feature Detection Model predicts, just as Koch and Poggio suggested, 
that FFA response should simply scale with the presence of faces in the 
presented image. The Predictive Coding Model, however, predicts something 
rather more complex. It predicts that FFA response should “reflect a 
summation of activity related to prediction (“face expectation”) and prediction 
error (“face surprise”)” (op cit p 1601). That is to say, it predicts that the 
(temporally rather blunt) fMRI signal recorded from the fusiform face area 
should reflect the activity of both putative kinds of cell: those specializing in 
prediction (“face-expectation”) and those specializing in detecting errors in 
prediction (“face-surprise”). This was then tested by collecting fMRI data from 
area FFA while independently varying both the presented features (face vs. 
house) and – by means of a simple (though not explicitly revealed to the 
participants) preceding cue manipulating subject’s unconscious degree of face 
expectation (low, medium, high) and hence their proper degree of ‘face 
surprise’. To do this, the experimenters probabilistically paired presentations of 
face/house with a 250 ms preceding color frame cue giving 25% (low), 50% 
(medium) or 75% (high) chance of the next image being a face. 
 
The results were clear. FFA activity showed a strong interaction between 
stimulus and face-expectation. FFA response was maximally differentiated only 
under conditions of low face expectation. Indeed, and quite surprisingly, FFA 
activity given either stimulus (face OR house) was indistinguishable under 
conditions of high face expectation! There is a very real sense then, in which 
FFA might (were it first investigated using these new paradigms) have been 
dubbed a ‘face-expectation area’. The authors conclude that, contrary to any 
simple feature-detection model: 
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“[FFA] responses appear to be determined by feature expectation and 
surprise rather than by stimulus features per se” Egner et al (2010) 
p16601  
 
The authors also controlled (by further model comparisons) for the possible 
role of attentional effects. But these could not, in any case, have made much 
contribution since it was face surprise, not face expectation, that accounted for 
the larger part of the BOLD (fMRI)x signal. In fact, the best-fit predictive 
coding model used a weighting in which face-surprise (error) units contributed 
about twice as muchxi to the BOLD signal as did face-expectation 
(representation) units, suggesting that much of the activity normally recorded 
using fMRI may be signaling prediction-error rather than detected features!  
 
This is an important result. In the authors’ own words: 
 
“the current study is to our knowledge the first investigation to formally 
and explicitly demonstrate that population responses in visual cortex are 
in fact better characterized as a sum of feature expectation and surprise 
responses than by bottom-up feature detection (with or without 
attention)” Egner et al (2010) p. 16607 
 
 
3. A New Look at Sensory Processing 
 
Among the guiding themes of this volume, we find the notion of the senses as 
“integrated information pickup systems” and various puzzles involving 
multimodal and crossmodal effects, plasticity, and the individuation of the 
senses. Hierarchical predictive processing offers insights into all these 
phenomena, rendering unsurprising much that was previously puzzling, and 
also rendering a little more puzzling some things that we might otherwise take 
for granted. In this final section I offer a few (tentative and preliminary) 
reflections on this altered landscape. 
 
3.1 Causes and Operators 
 
Reich et al (2011) report some interesting new fMRI findings regarding the so-
called Visual Word Form Area (VWFA). This is an area within the ventral 
stream that responds to proper letter strings: the kind that might reasonably 
form a word in a given language. Response in this area was already known to be 
independent of surface details such as case, font, and spatial location. The 
recent study shows that it is actually tracking something even more abstract 
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than visual word form. It appears to be tracking wordform, regardless of the 
modality of the transducing stream. Thus the very same area is activated in 
congenitally blind subjects during Braille reading. The fact that the early input 
here is tactile rather than visual makes no difference to the recruitment of 
VWFA. This supports the idea (Pascual-Leone and Hamilton (2001)) of such 
brain areas as ‘metamodal operators’ that are “defined by a given computation 
that is applied regardless of the sensory input received”.  
 
All this fits neatly, as Reich et al (2011 p.365) themselves note, with the 
predictive coding account in which higher levels of the cortical hierarchy learn 
to track the ‘hidden causes’ that account for, and hence predict, the sensory 
consequences of distal states of affairs. In a deliberate echo of the Egner et al 
work on the fusiform face area, Reich et al speculate that much activity in 
VWFA might reflect modality-transcending predictions about the sensory 
consequences of words. Just as (as we saw in 2.3 above) much of the activity in 
FFA is related to top-down face-prediction rather than the bottom-up 
detection of faces, so the VWFA might be generating top-down predictions 
using modality-transcending models of wordhood. The metamodality of 
VWFA would then “explain its ability to apply top-down predictions to both 
visual and tactile stimuli” (Reich et al (2011) p.365. 
 
3.2 Cross-Modal and Multi-Modal Effects  
 
The widespread existence of cross- and multi-modal context effects on early 
‘unimodal’ sensory processing constitutes one of the major findings of the last 
decade of sensory neuroscience (see eg Hupe et al (1998), Murray et al (2002), 
Smith and Muckli (2010)). Thus Murrray et al (2002) display the influence of 
high-level shape information on the responses of cells in early visual area V1, 
while Smith and Muckli (2010) show similar effects (using as input partially 
occluded natural scenes) even on wholly non-stimulated (that is to say, not 
directly stimulated via the driving sensory signal) visual areas. In addition, 
Murray et al (2006) showed that activation in V1 is influenced by a top-down 
size illusion, while Muckli et al (2005) and Muckli (2010) report activity relating 
to an apparent motion illusion in V1. Even apparently ‘unimodal’ early 
responses are influenced (Kriegstein and Giraud (2006)) by information derived 
from other modalities, and hence will commonly reflect a variety of multimodal 
associations. Strikingly, even the expectation that a relevant input will turn out 
to be in one modality (e.g. auditory) rather than another (e.g.visual) turns out to 
improve performance, presumably by enhancing “the weight of bottom-up 
input for perceptual inference on a given sensory channel” (Langner et al 
(2011) p.10).  
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This whole smörgåsbord of context effects flows very naturally from the 
hierarchical predictive coding model. If so-called visual, tactile, or auditory 
sensory cortex is actually operating using a cascade of feedback from higher 
levels to actively predict the unfolding sensory signals (the ones originally 
transduced using the various dedicated receptor banks of vision, sound, touch, 
etc) then we should not be in the least surprised to find extensive multi-modal 
and cross-modal effects (including these kinds of ‘filling-in’) even on ‘early’ 
sensory responsexii. One reason this will be so is that the notion of ‘early’ 
sensory response is in one sense now misleading, for expectation-induced 
context effects will simply propagate all the way down the system, priming, 
generating, and altering ‘early’ responses as far down as V1. Any statistically 
valid correlations, registered within the ‘metamodal’ (or at least, increasingly 
information-integrating) areas towards the top of the processing hierarchy, can 
inform the predictions that then cascade down, through what were previously 
thought of as much more unimodal areas, all the way to the areas closer to the 
sensory peripheries. Such effects are inconsistent with the idea of V1 as a site 
for simple, stimulus-driven, bottom-up feature-detection using cells with fixed 
(context-inflexible) receptive fields. But they are fully consistent with (indeed, 
mandated by) models that depict V1 activity as constantly negotiated on the 
basis of a flexible combination of top-down predictions and driving sensory 
signalxiii.  
 
 
 
3.3 Expectations and Conscious Perception 
 
All this has implications for the study of (the neural correlates of) sensory 
awareness. The key observation (Melloni et al (2011)), and one that will surely 
add new layers of complexity to many familiar experimental paradigms, is that 
expectation speeds up conscious awareness.  
 
We can creep up on this with some mundane reflections. It is intuitively 
obvious that, for example, a familiar song played using a poor radio receiver 
will sound much clearer than an unfamiliar one. But whereas we might have 
thought of this, within a simple feed-forward feature-detection framework, as 
some kind of memory effect, it now seems just as reasonable to think of it as a 
genuinely perceptual one. The clear-sounding percept, after all, is constructed 
in just the same way as the fuzzy-sounding percept, albeit using a better set of 
top-down predictions (priors, in the Bayesian translation of the story). That is 
to say – or so I would suggest - the familiar song really does sound clearer. It is 
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not that memory later does some filling-in that affects, in some backward-
looking way, how we judge the song to have sounded. Rather, the top-down 
effects bite in the very earliest stages of processing, leaving us littlexiv 
conceptual space (or so it seems to me) to depict the effects as anything other 
than enhanced-but-genuine perception.  
 
We can illustrate this with a little thought experiment. Imagine we discover a 
creature whose auditory apparatus is highly tuned to the detection of some 
biologically relevant sound. Imagine too that that tuning consists largely in a 
strong set of priors for that sound, such that the creature can detect it despite 
considerable noise in the ambient signal (a kind of cocktail party effect). Surely 
we would simply describe this as a case of acute perception? Then we must say 
the same, it seems to me, of the music-lover hearing a familiar song from a 
low-quality radio. 
 
 
In exactly this vein, Melloni et al (2011) show that the onset time required to 
form a reportable conscious percept varies according to our expectations. 
Following a fairly complex series of experiments (due to the need to carefully 
control for effects that would be best attributed to non-perceptual ‘advance 
guessing’ rather than to genuine enhanced visibility for the better-predicted 
stimulus), the authors conclude that ‘expectations alter the threshold of 
visibility’ (op cit p.1393). They explain this result by explicit appeal to a 
hierarchical predictive coding framework in which “conscious perception is the 
result of a hypothesis test that iterates until information is consistent across 
higher and lower areas” (op cit p. 1394).  Using electroencephalographic (EEG) 
signatures, it was calculated that conscious perception could occur as rapidly as 
100ms faster for a well-predicted stimulus, and hence that: 
 
“the signatures of visibility are not bound to processes with a strict 
latency but depend on the presence of expectations” (Melloni et al 
(2011) p. 1395 
 
In addition, Muckli (2010) reports that predicted stimuli, although able to drive 
better and faster behavioral responses, showed reduced fMRI activation in V1. 
This is further evidence for the predictive coding story since: 
 
“Finding reduced activity related to increased performance fits well with 
the framework of predictive coding…but is difficult to explain 
otherwise” Muckli (2010) p. 135 
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3.4 Sensorimotor Contingency Theory 
 
The notion that sensory experience is in some way bound up with predictions 
and expectations resonates to some degree with recent important and 
influential work in ‘sensorimotor contingency theory’ (O’Regan and Noë 
(2001), Noë (2004), Noë (2009)). There are, however, some notable differences. 
First, sensorimotor contingency theory (SMC) staunchly champions the view 
that the predictions that matter will mostly concern the ways the sensory signal 
will vary with bodily movement. That is to say, they are both prospective (they 
concern future variation in the incoming signal) and their contents are 
sensorimotor profiles. Such prospective sensorimotor predictions, though 
often extremely important, constitute merely one dimension of the very large 
space of features and properties that can figure in the downward-cascades 
posited by hierarchical predictive coding accounts. Moreover, the SMC model 
(at least as explicated and defended by Noë (2004) (2009)) looks committed to 
an implausibly shallow processing account (see Clark (2008) ch. 8) that omits 
any essential appeal to those multiple, stacked layers of internal representation  
- the crucial hierarchical generative model - that translate top-down predictions, 
via many intervening stages, into predictions concerning the actual ebb and 
flow of the driving sensory inputs. SMC models, though absolutely correct to 
highlight prediction and expectation in their account of perception, are thus 
neglecting the critical machinery (of prediction-induced hierarchical generative 
models) that enable brains like ours to infer complex hidden causal structures 
in the world. 
 
 
3.5 Distinguishing and Extending the Senses 
 
The predictive coding framework offers, we saw, a powerful way of 
accommodating all manner of cross- and multi-modal effects on perception. It 
depicts the senses as working together to provide feedback (recall the 
explanatory inversion highlighted in section 1.3 above) to a linked set of 
prediction devices that are attempting to track unfolding states of the world 
across multiple spatial and temporal scales. This delivers a very natural account 
of efficient multi-modal cue integration (see Ernst and Banks (2002)), and 
allows top-down effects to penetrate even the lowest (earliest) elements of 
sensory processing. It also induces (1.2 above) a potent duality between sensing 
and top-down generation, so that to perceive some state of affairs requires the 
system to be capable (though not necessarily of its own volition) of 
endogenously generating the relevant sensory signature. Certain things that 
might otherwise be taken for granted then stand in need of explanation.  
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One is the existence of distinct modalities in experience. Why, given that the 
senses work together to provide ongoing feedback on predictions that aim to 
track causal structure in the world, do we experience sight as different from 
sound, touch as different from smell, and so on? Why, that is, do we not simply 
experience states of affairs without the sense of distinct modalities? I would 
speculate (and no more than speculate) that the answer may involve the 
different kinds of uncertainty that are associated with different sensory 
channels. In a thick fog, for example, vision is unreliable (delivering 
information with high uncertainty) while audition is less affected. The brain will 
need to mark these differences so as to weight and integrate the available cues 
(from multiple sense organs) in different ways on different occasions. Perhaps 
we experience sensory modalities as different from one another just to the 
extent that they are prone (in many contexts) to deliver information with very 
different degrees of uncertainty? Where the uncertainties more nearly match, 
we experience one modality (eg vision) with multiple sense organs (two eyes). 
 
This would mean that the character of sensory experience has (at least) two 
components. One is the stacked set of generative models that capture the 
regularities in the world. The other is the signature forms of uncertainty 
associated with the sensory channel itself.  
  
3.6 Perceiving and Imagining 
 
Another question the new framework raises is, Why is imagination not just like 
conscious perception? Given the role of generative models, and the deep 
duality between perception and the top-down generation of the sensory signal, 
one might expect imagination to share the full (rich, vivid) experiential 
signature of ordinary perceptionxv. Yet (bracketing cases of hallucination etc) 
this does not seem to be the case. Here too, I will venture one last (mere) 
speculation.  
 
Sensory processing, on these models, involves predicting (across a hierarchy of 
processing regions) the driving signal transduced from the world. That means 
that the flow of information from the environment really matters, as it delivers 
the evolving data stream that the top-down model has to try (using the linked 
stack of generative models) to match. An important feature of this process is 
that the weight that is given to the driving sensory signal (hence the value of 
prediction errors concerning that signal) can be varied according to its degree 
of certainty or uncertainty. This is achieved by altering the gain (the ‘volume’ to 
use the standard auditory analogy) on the error-units accordingly. The effect of 
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this is to allow the brain to vary the balance between sensory inputs and prior 
expectations at different levels (see Friston (2009) p. 299). This means that the 
weighting of sensory prediction errors (hence the relative influence of sensory 
inputs and prior expectations) at any level of processing within the whole 
hierarchical cascade may itself be flexibly modulated. This is sometimes 
described as optimizing “the relative precision of empirical (top-down) priors 
and (bottom-up) sensory evidence” (Friston (2009) p. 299). All this is 
suggestive, it seems to me, of a possible explanation for the experiential 
asymmetry between perception and (ordinary non-vivid) imagination. 
 
Thus suppose you are looking for an object on a crowded surface. You expect 
to see it somewhere, but you are not sure where. Your brain must temporarily 
increase the weighting on the fine spatial information carried by the driving 
signal. That way, you don’t simply mistakenly see it there (at such and such a 
location) just because you are expecting to see it somewhere. To match the 
driving signal with a top-down prediction here demands accounting for the 
sensory signal in great detail, all the way down (as it were).  
 
Non-vivid mental imagery, by contrast, may be calling only upon higher levels 
of the generative model. Thus compare the case where you are asked to 
imagine your walk to work. Here, early (closer to retinotopic) stages of the 
processing hierarchy can be allowed substantial leeway, and need not be forced 
to settle into one interpretation or another. It seems plausible (though this is, to 
repeat, currently no more than speculation) that under such conditions one 
might experience the self-generated imagery as fuzzier and less distinct than 
online perception, even though perception and imagination are simply different 
ways of deploying the very same circuits and fundamental capacitiesxvi.  
 
 
4. Conclusions: Perceiving, Imagining….Knowing? 
 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to introduce the notion of sensory 
perception as a form of probabilistic prediction involving a hierarchy of 
generative modelsxvii.  This broad vision brings together frontline research in 
machine learning and a growing body of neuroscientific conjecture and 
evidence. It provides a simple and elegant account of multi-modal and cross-
modal effects in perception, and has implications for the study of (the neural 
correlates of) conscious experience. It also suggests, or so I have argued, a deep 
unity between perceiving and imagining. For to perceive the world (at least as 
we do) is to deploy internal resources capable of endogenously generating those 
same sensory effects: capable, that is, of generating those same activation 
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patterns via a top-down sweep involving multiple intermediate layers of 
processing. That suggests a fundamental linkage between ‘passive perception’ 
and active imagining, with each capacity being continuously bootstrapped by 
the other. Perceiving and imagining (if these models are on the right track) are 
simultaneous effects of a single underlying neural strategy. 
 
In closing, I cannot resist sharing one further thought, even though it goes far 
beyond the conclusions warranted by the present treatment. It is that this unity 
of perceiving and imagining in turn suggests a deep continuity between 
perceiving (thus construed) and understandingxviii. For such systems are able to 
predict the way the sensory signal will evolve, on multiple temporal and spatial 
scales, and to generate those transformations in advance using endogenous 
resources alone. When such systems perceive the world, they know how the 
world is structured by hidden causes and they know how it is likely to evolve 
over time. This, surely, is to make deep inroads not just into the explanation of 
effective perception but also into the origins of meaning and semantics: the 
elusive realm of ‘aboutness’ itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This paper owes much to discussions and exchanges at The Senses Research 
Workshop (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, 2009), at the workshop on Predictive Coding 
and the Senses (Institute of Philosophy, London, 2011), and during my stay as a 
Visiting Fellow at the SAGE Institute at UC Santa Barbara. Thanks to Dustin 
Stokes, Mohan Matthen, and Barry Smith for many useful discussions and for 
making the workshops possible. Thanks to Mike Gazzaniga and the audiences 
at UCSB, and especially Michael Rescorla. Thanks too to Karl Friston, Jakob 
Hohwy, and Chris Williams for helping me begin to negotiate the dizzying 
maze of work on predictive coding, active inference, and generative models. 
They are not to blame for any errors or speculative excesses. The paper also 
benefitted greatly from helpful suggestions from Jon Bird, and from the editors 
of the present volume. This work was supported in part by an AHRC 
Speculative Research Grant (PI Y. Rogers, Open University) ‘Extending the 
Senses and Self Through Novel Technologies’ 
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NOTES 
                                                        
i Examples include Hubel and Wiesel (1965), Marr (1982), Biederman (1987). 
 
ii Actually, a variant form of predictive coding also characterizes the work of the retina (see 
Hosoya et al (2005). But this nicety need not concern us here. 
 
iii By ‘perceive’ I here mean ‘perceive in a rich, full-blooded manner’. Obviously, a simple 
robot that locomotes to a light source need not, and probably should not,  deploy a stack of 
generative models to do so. The need for generative models emerges most clearly when 
systems must deal with noise, ambiguity, and uncertainty.  
 
iv The (theoretically mandated)  duality of perception and generation means that a percept 
and a hallucination could (in principle at least) involve identical neural states. This may put 
pressure, it seems to me, on some (but not all) formulations of disjunctivism - the idea, 
roughly, that veridical percepts and hallucinations, illusions etc share no common kind. 
Much turns, of course, on how the somewhat obscure disjunctivist claim is to be unpacked. 
For a pretty comprehensive sampling of possible formulations, see essays in A. Haddock and 
F. Macpherson (eds.) (2008), and in Byrne, A. and Logue, H. (eds.) (2009). 
v The crucial innovation was to learn one layer of representation at a time using what Hinton 
calls Restricted Boltzmann Machines, with a further tweak to fine-tune the resulting overall 
model – for an accessible summary, see Hinton (2007). 
 
vi Compare, for example, the kinds of model described by Hinton (2007) with that of Jehee 
and Ballard (2009).  
 
vii It will not in general, however, be easy to determine what individual units/neurons within 
a layer represent – see Hinton (2007) box 2, p.433. 
 
viii Possible alternative implementations are discussed in  Spratling and Johnson (2006), and 
in Engel et al (2001)): 
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ix It is also worth noting that models that fit the rather more general profile described in 1.2 
above (viz, using hierarchical generative models to predict the sensory signals) are not 
compelled to endorse the full ‘explaining away’ procedure. Instead, at each level, the full 
‘silencing’ of representation units by (good) downward prediction is actually only one – neat, 
easy-to-grasp, but potentially quite extreme - option among many for how best to combine 
top-down predictions with bottom-up inputs (for some glimpses of the much larger 
computational spaces hereabouts, see Feng et al (2002), Hinton (2007), Bengio and Lecun 
(2007), Heess et al (2009), Hinton (2010))  
 
 
x This is a measure of relative neural activity (‘brain activation’) as indexed by changes in 
blood flow and blood oxygen level. The assumption is that neural activity incurs a metabolic 
cost that this signal reflects. It is thus widely acknowledged (see e.g. Heeger and Ross (2002)) 
to be a rather indirect, assumption-laden, and ‘blunt’ measure compared to, say, single cell 
recording. Nonetheless, new forms of multivariate pattern analysis are able to overcome 
some of the limitations of earlier work using this technique. 
 
xi This could, the authors note, be due to some fundamental metabolic difference in 
processing cost between representing and error-detection, or it may be that for other reasons 
the BOLD signal tracks top- down inputs to a region more than bottom-up ones (see Egner 
at al (2010) p. 16607). 
 
xii This may also have implications for other familiar questions, such as  whether context 
really  alters the nature of a perceptual experience. Does the wine really taste better when 
tasted within sight of the sea? Or do we merely then judge it to taste better (do we, that is, 
merely judge the same taste differently, due to some contextual effect)? Or is this simply a non-
question (recall Dennett’s (1988)  treatment of the coffee tasters Chase and Sanborn)? The 
proposed framework allows us to at least frame the issue better, though a proper resolution 
remains elusive. Thus  suppose selection of some top-level amodal feature complex (‘fresh, 
healthy’) is caused by the need to account for (predict) visual sea-features impinging on the 
eyes. If that in turn affects which higher–level generative models are selected and applied to 
predict the unfolding taste and flavor of the wine, that might favour encodings of e.g. ‘young 
and vital’ over close rivals like ‘acidic and immature’. Since this kind of multi-modal give and 
take is just the norm for any perceptual unfolding on these models, I’d like to say that means 
the wine really tastes different. But unfortunately it is not yet clear that this is mandated. 
Someone could say (pursuing a more conservative option) that the wine really tastes 
different only if such contextual nuancing alters the suite of predictions that are being 
successfully applied  far down the gustatory processing hierarchy, at levels that are intuitively 
encoding information about the low-level driving chemical signals themselves. If so, then 
were there no alteration in those predictions that would mean no alteration in the target 
experience. Alternatively, experience could be much more holistically determined so that 
alterations anywhere up the hierarchy would impact the percept, even if they make the very 
same predictions lower down. This is my own preferred (but admittedly unargued) option:  
conscious experience reflects the settling of the whole hierarchy into some temporarily stable 
state.  
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xiii Reflecting on this new vision of ‘early’ sensory processing, Lars Muckli writes that “It is 
conceivable that V1 is, ﬁrst of all, the target region for cortical feedback and then, in a 
second instance, a region that compares cortical feedback to incoming information. Sensory 
stimulation might be the minor task of the cortex, whereas its major task is to […] predict 
upcoming stimulation as precisely as possible [ ..] ” Muckli (2010) p.137 
 
xiv There is doubtless some kind of slippery slope here, as we progressively degrade the 
driving signal and upregulate the expectations. Negotiating this complex terrain is, however, 
a task for another day. 
 
xv Thanks to Mark Sprevak (personal communication) for raising this issue 
 
xvi Reddy et al (2010) neatly demonstrate that imagery and perception are not simply 
activating overlapping neural areas but are actually deploying the very same fine-grained 
internal representations when they do so. In the cases they investigate, that overlap is 
restricted, as the present speculation suggests, to somewhat higher levels of the visual 
processing hierarchy. The authors suggest, though, that were the task to have demanded it, 
lower level areas such as V1 might have been re-activated in the same top-down manner.  
 
xvii Technically, there is then a single (but hierarchical) generative model. Nothing in the 
present treatment turns on this detail. 
 
xviii For a rather more conceptual route to what seems to me to be a similar conclusion, see 
Timothy Williamson’s New York Times ‘Opinionator’ blog entry ‘Reclaiming the Imagination’ 
available at: 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/reclaiming-the-imagination/ 
 
 
